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Abstract: We propose and numerically demonstrate a security-enhanced chaotic 
communication system by introducing optical temporal encryption (OTE) into the modulated 
chaotic carrier (chaos + message). In the proposed scheme, the message is firstly embedded 
into the original chaotic carrier generated by a conventional external-cavity semiconductor 
laser (ECSL), and before being transmitted to the receiver end, the modulated chaotic carrier 
propagates through an OTE module that consists of one phase modulator driven by a secret 
sinusoidal signal and one dispersive component. Our numerical results indicate that, as a 
direct result of the spectral expansion effect of the sinusoidal phase modulation and the phase-
to-intensity conversion effect of the dispersive component, the original chaotic carrier can be 
encrypted as an uncorrelated chaotic signal with a flat spectrum and an efficiently-suppressed 
time delay signature, this greatly enhances the privacy of the modulated chaotic carrier. 
Moreover, comparing with the conventional ECSL-based chaotic communication systems 
without OTE, the proposed scheme not only shows significantly higher security against 
attacks including direct linear filtering and synchronization utilization, but also provide 
additional physical key space to further enhance the system security. In addition, by making 
use of the transmission dispersion for decryption, the proposed encryption scheme supports 
dispersion-compensation-free secure fiber communication, and it also supports centralized 
encryption/decryption in wavelength division multiplexing secure chaotic communication 
systems. The proposed scheme provides a novel plug-and-play encryption method for 
implementation in high-security chaotic communication systems. 
© 2019 Optical Society of America under the terms of the OSA Open Access Publishing Agreement 
1. Introduction 
Chaos communication has attracted extensive attention for its advantage of physical-layer 
security enhancement, since Pecora and Carrols demonstrated chaos synchronizations in two 
chaotic systems [1-3]. Over the last decade, external cavity semiconductor laser (ECSL) has 
been considered as one of the most promising candidates for all-optical chaotic 
communications, random bit generation and secure key distribution, since it is easy to obtain 
wideband chaotic signals from ECSLs with proper feedbacks [4-9]. The experimental 
demonstrations of all-optical chaotic communications in Athens have proved its feasibility of 
utilizing ECSLs in commercial optical networks [10]. In conventional ECSL-based chaotic 
communication systems, after having embedded messages into chaotic carriers, the modulated 
chaotic carriers (chaos + message) are directly transmitted to the receiver end for message 
recovery [2-4, 11, 12]. As such, the eavesdropper can easily access the modulated chaotic 
carrier from public links. It has been proved that when the bit rate is relatively low, the 
message hidden in the chaotic carrier can be intercepted by using a linear filter with a proper 
cutoff frequency, this is termed the direct linear filtering (DLF) attack [13, 14]. In addition, 
the eavesdropper may also intercept the message by amplifying the chaotic carrier split from 
the public link and then injecting it into a semiconductor laser to construct a similar chaotic 
communication system, in virtue of the injection-locking mechanism. This type of attack is 
referred to as the synchronization utilization attack [13]. Therefore, it is important to further 
enhance the privacy of the modulated chaotic carrier propagating over a public link, in order 
to protect the security of the message. 
On the other hand, the privacy of a chaotic carrier source is also a crucial issue as it may 
threat the system security. In the conventional ECSL system, the feedback light is a linear 
time-delayed replica of the output of a SL, the time delay signature (TDS) that denotes the 
feedback delay can be easily identified by calculating the autocorrelation, delayed mutual 
information, or permutation entropy of the chaos waveform [15-18]. Once the eavesdropper 
knows the precise feedback delay by these TDS identification methods, the eavesdropper can 
reconstruct an illegal receiver with a similar ECSL with a feedback delay equal to the TDS. 
Subsequently, the eavesdropper can intercept the message by synchronization utilization 
attack, i.e., the chaotic carrier split from the public link is firstly amplified and then injected 
into the illegal receiver ECSL. With the injection-locking effect, the output of the illegal 
receiver ECSL can synchronize with the link chaotic carrier, and consequently, the message 
may be intercepted illegally. For this reason, the TDS compression for chaotic carriers is also 
vital for enhancing the information security of chaotic communication systems. 
In this paper, a security-enhanced all-optical chaotic communication system is proposed, 
where an optical temporal encryption (OTE) making use of phase modulation and phase-to-
intensity conversion is introduced to encrypt the modulated chaotic carrier as an uncorrelated 
wideband and TDS-suppressed chaotic signal prior to its transmission over a public link. At 
the receiver end, the modulated chaotic carrier is firstly decrypted from the transmitted signal 
by applying a matching optical temporal decryption (OTD) module, and then injecting the 
signal emerging from the OTD module into a receiver ECSL to achieve original chaotic 
carrier synchronization for the final message decryption. It is shown that the proposed scheme 
can greatly enhance the bandwidth and efficiently suppress the TDS of original chaotic 
carrier. Moreover, it can also efficiently defense against the attacks of DLF and 
synchronization utilization, thus the proposed scheme provides considerably higher security 
with respect to the conventional ECSL-based chaotic communication systems. Finally, the 
use of transmission dispersion can be made in chaotic carrier decryption, and centralized 
secure wavelength division multiplexing (WDM) chaotic communications can also be 
achieved. 
2. Theory and numerically modelling model 
Figure 1 shows the schematic of the proposed secure chaotic communication system. At the 
transmitter end, a conventional ECSL that is termed as master semiconductor laser (MSL) is 
adopted to provide an original chaotic carrier, and an optical intensity modulator is used to 
encrypt the message onto the original chaotic carrier. While significantly different from the 
conventional ECSL-based chaotic communication systems, in the proposed scheme, the 
modulated chaotic carrier (chaos + message) is sent to an OTE module for the carrier 
encryption instead of being directly transmitted to the receiver end. The OTE module is 
composed of one phase modulator (PM) driven by a secret key and a dispersion component 
(DE). The aim of OTE is to hide the modulated chaotic carrier to avoid its direct exposure to 
the public. With the phase modulation, the spectrum of the modulated chaotic carrier is 
expanded greatly in the optical domain, and then the dispersion component converts the 
optical-spectrum-expanded phase chaos into intensity, leading to a greatly enhanced 
bandwidth and a flattened spectrum of the modulated chaotic carrier in the electronic domain. 
On the other hand, due to the nonlinearity of the PM and the dispersion-associated nonlinear 
waveform distortion effect, the periodicity (induced by the linear feedback of the MSL) in the 
modulated chaotic carrier can be efficiently destructed, as such the TDS can be suppressed 
significantly. Technically speaking, with the OTE, the modulated chaotic carrier is encrypted 
as a totally different chaotic signal, this can greatly enhance the privacy of the chaotic carrier 
propagating over the public link. At the receiver end, the transmitted chaotic carrier firstly 
passes through an OTD module to decrypt the modulated chaotic carrier, after that, the 
recovered chaotic carrier is injected into a receiver ECSL referred to as slave semiconductor 
laser (SSL) to achieve chaos synchronization for the final message decryption. The 
configuration of the OTD module is similar to that of the OTE module, except that the signs 
of the secret PM driving signal and the coefficient of the dispersion component (DD) are 
opposite to those of the OTE module. Since the signal transmitting over the public link is the 
OTE chaotic signal, the privacy of the modulated chaotic carrier is thus greatly enhanced. 
Under such a scenario, without applying a matching OTD module, the eavesdropper is not 
able to recover the modulated chaotic carrier, let alone to intercept the message. As a direct 
result, the information security is greatly enhanced. In addition, due to the fact that the phase 
modulators and dispersive components in the OTE and OTD modules work operate in a wide 
range of wavelength, the proposed system simultaneously supports centralized 
encryption/decryption for of several WDM channels simultaneously. For Under such a 
scenario, the messages conveyed by on different chaotic communication channels are firstly 
embedded into the original chaotic carrier, and then the modulated chaotic carriers are 
multiplexed and sent through one OTE module.  With the OTE module, the multiplexed 
WDM chaotic carrier would be encrypted as a compound signal for public link transmission. 
At the receiver end, the compound signal is firstly decrypted by the OTD module, and then 
the WDM modulated chaotic carriers (chaos + message) are derived from the decrypted 
signal and used for final message decryption. 
 
Fig. 1. Schematic of the proposed secure chaotic communication system with optical temporal 
encryption/decryption (OTE/D). MSL(SSL), master (slave) semiconductor laser; OC, optical 
coupler; R, reflector; M, intensity modulator; D, Dispersion component; PM, phase modulator; 
OI, optical isolator; PD, photodiode; m(t), message; m’(t), recovery message. 
To numerically explore the dynamics of the ECSLs, the well-known Lang-Kobayashi rate 
equations are adopted, whose complex electric field amplitude E(t) and the intra-cavity carrier 
number N(t) of the MSL are written as [3-5, 19-21] 
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While the rate equations for the SSL at the receiver end are written as 
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In these equations, the subscripts m and s denote the MSL and SSL, respectively. Einj(t) is the 
injected chaotic carrier that is recovered by the OTD module after transmitting over the public 
link. G(t) denotes the optical gain which is defined as Eq. (5). I is the injection current, q is 
the electron charge. The other intrinsic parameters include the linewidth enhancement factor α, 
the angle frequency ω, the carrier lifetime τe, the photon lifetime τp, the spontaneous emission 
rate β, the carrier number at transparency N0, the differential gain coefficient g, and the gain 
saturation factor ε. k and τf are the feedback strength and delay, respectively, and σ is the 
injection strength. The unity-variance and zero-mean Gaussian noise source χ(t) is introduced 
to model the spontaneous emission noise [18]. 
In the OTE module, phase modulation can be performed by a typical electro-optical phase 
modulator such as a QPSK modulator. Here for the proof-of-concept demonstration, we 
choose one typical LiNiO3 phase modulator, which is mathematically described as 
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where the subscripts “in” and “out” denote the input and output of the PM, respectively. The 
PM driving signal is a secret key for both the OTE and the OTD, it is a radio frequency 
sinusoidal signal that is mathematically described as Vkey(t)=A0cos(2πf0t), where A0 and f0 
stand for the amplitude and the frequency of the secret key signal, respectively. The 
dispersion component DE can be constructed with a dispersive fiber or a chirped fiber Bragg 
grating (CFBG). For simplicity, we take a dispersive fiber here. When excluding the higher 
order dispersions, the transfer function of the dispersive fiber in the frequency domain can be 
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where K1 is a constant, L is the length of the dispersive fiber, β2E=-DEλ2/2πc denotes the 
group velocity dispersion, λ is the wavelength of the chaotic carrier and c is the velocity of 
light in vacuum. Applying the inverse Fourier transformation to Eq. (7), we can obtain the 
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where F-1 means the inverse Fourier transformation, and K2 is a constant associated with 
β2ELE. 
The transmission link consists of a standard single mode fiber (SMF), which can be 








F t i t F F
E i E i E
i E E E
z t t
   
  
    
  
                              (9)
 
where Et is the envelop of the electric field of the OTE chaotic carrier, αF is the loss 
coefficient of the SMF, γ is the nonlinear coefficient of the SMF, β2F and β3F are the second-
order and the third-order chromatic dispersions, respectively.  
The configuration of the OTD module is a symmetric replica with respect to the OTE 
module, while the amplitude of the key signal is inverse to that of the OTE module, which 
can be described as V'key(t)=-A0cos(2πf0t). The dispersion coefficient (DD) and the length (LD) 
of the dispersive fiber in the OTD module satisfy the following condition: 
0E E F F D DD L D L D L                                                        (10) 
where DF=-β2F2πc/λ2 and LF are the dispersion coefficient and the length of the SMF link, 
respectively. Here the transmission dispersion is considered in the OTD module, as such no 
additional transmission dispersion compensation is needed. In fact, the transmission fiber can 
also be considered as a second cascaded dispersive component of the OTE module, and then 
Eq. (10) sets is the essential conditions for the achievement of OTD module having an inverse 
process .which is the inverse transformation of OTE.   
To quantify the correlation and synchronization quality of the chaotic signals in the 
proposed system, we define the cross-correlation function (CCF) of the intensities of chaotic 
carriers as [22, 24-26] 
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where I(t) is the intensity of a chaotic carrier, the subscripts X, Y represent two different 
chaotic carriers in the system, the operation <·> means time averaging, and Δt is the time that 
IY(t) is shifted with respect to IX(t). This equation can also be used to calculate the 
autocorrelation function (ACF) by setting IX(t)=IY(t). 
To numerically investigate the proposed system, the fourth order Runge-Kutta algorithm 
is adopted to solve the rate equations, and the split-step Fourier method is used to solve the 
nonlinear Schrödinger equation. Unless otherwise stated, the values of the parameters used in 
the simulations are listed in Table I. In the section below, we numerically investigate the 
properties of the optical temporal encryption and those of the chaos synchronization and 
communication. 
Table 1. Values of parameters used in the simulations [13, 14, 20] 
Symbol Parameter Value 
Ith Threshold current 14.7 mA 
I Bias current of MSL and SSL  1.5Ith
 
λ Operation wavelength 1550 nm 
α Linewidth enhancement factor 5 
τe Carrier lifetime in SL active region  2ns 
τp Photon lifetime in SL active region 2ps 
β Spontaneous emission rate 1×10-6 ns-1 
N0 Transparency carrier number 1.5×10
8 
g Differential gain coefficient  1.5×10-8 ps-1 
ε Gain saturation factor  5×10-7 
k Feedback strength 15 ns
-1 
τf Feedback delay 3 ns 
σ Injection strength 80 ns-1 
LE Length of dispersive fiber in OTE module 3 km 
DE Dispersion coefficient of dispersive fiber in OTE module 500 ps/nm/km 
K1 Constant factor of transfer response of dispersive fiber 1 
A0 Amplitude of secret key Vπ 
f0 Frequency of secret key 9.1 GHz 
αF Loss coefficient of fiber link 0.2 dB/km 
β2F Velocity dispersion of single mode fiber 20.4 ps
2/ km 
β3F Third-order dispersion of fiber link 0.1ps
3/km 
LF Length of transmission single-mode fiber 50 km 
3. Properties of optical temporal encryption 
Figure 2 shows the intensity waveforms, RF spectra and ACF curves of the original chaotic 
carrier and the encrypted chaotic signal, in the absence of message transmission. It can be 
seen that the original chaotic carrier generated by the MSL (IM(t)) is encrypted as a totally 
different signal. The OTE chaotic signal (IOTE(t)) shows a significantly flattened spectrum 
having a wide bandwidth with respect to the original chaotic carrier. By examining the 
efficient bandwidths of these two chaotic signals, it is found that the efficient bandwidth of 
the chaotic carrier is expanded from the original 11.5 GHz to 49.4 GHz, indicating that the 
bandwidth of the original chaotic carrier is enhanced by more than 3 times. Here the efficient 
bandwidth is defined as the span between the direct current (DC) and the frequency where 
80% of energy is contained in the RF spectrum [16, 20, 27]. It is also worth noting that the 
dips in the RF spectrum of the OTE chaotic carrier is attributed to the chromatic dispersion-
induced power fading effect, as theoretically analyzed in [28]. On the other hand, as shown in 
Figs. 2(c) and 2(f), the TDS in the original chaotic carrier is also efficiently compressed by 
the OTE module, this means the complexity of the chaotic carrier is also greatly enhanced. 
The excellent TDS compression feature can minimize the risk that any eavesdroppers use the 
ACF-enabled feedback delay to reconstruct a similar ECSL system to intercept the message, 
in virtue of the synchronization utilization attack. 
 
Fig.2. Temporal waveform, RF spectrum, and ACF of the original and encrypted chaotic carrier.  
 
Fig.3. (a) Efficient bandwidth EB (GHz) of OTE chaotic carrier versus the index A0 and 
frequency f0 of phase modulation; (b) EB (GHz) of OTE chaotic carrier in the space of the 
dispersion coefficient D and the PM frequency f0, for the case of A0=Vπ. 
To further investigate the influence of the OTE on the original chaotic signal, the efficient 
bandwidth and TDS characteristics of the encrypted chaotic signal are further systematically 
investigated. Figure 3(a) shows the variation of the efficient bandwidth of the encrypted 
chaotic signal as a function of amplitude (A0) and frequency (f0) of the key signal. It is seen 
that the efficient bandwidth of the OTE chaotic signal is monotonically enhanced as the 
increase of A0 and f0. Figure 3(b) shows the influences of the dispersion coefficient D and the 
PM frequency f0 on the efficient bandwidth of the OTE chaotic carrier, for the case of A0=Vπ. 
It is shown that as the absolute value of the dispersion coefficient is larger than 10 ps/nm/km, 
it is easy to obtain a wideband bandwidth OTE chaotic carrier with a high PM frequency, and 
similar to that in Fig. 3(a), the efficient bandwidth of the OTE chaotic signal is also 
monotonically enhanced with increasing PM frequency. The OTE-induced bandwidth 
enhancement is originated from the spectrum expansion effect of PM. The instantaneous 
frequency offset derived from the phase modulation expressed in Eq. (6) is determined by 
0 0 0( ) sin(2 )PMf t A f f t                                     (12) 
thus, the maximum frequency offset that is closely related to the bandwidth of the OTE 
chaotic carrier is approximately  
0 0maxPM
f A f                                              (13) 
It is clear that, when f0 (A0) is fixed, |ΔfPM|max monotonically increases with increasing A0 (f0). 
The increase in |ΔfPM|max allows that the bandwidth enhancement of the OTE chaotic carrier.  
These discussions indicate that, with the proposed OTE scheme, the efficient bandwidth of 
the chaotic carrier can be expanded significantly. Bandwidth of the OTE chaotic carrier 
beyond 100GHz is achievable when sufficiently large values of A0, f0, and D are adopted. 
On the other hand, Fig. 4 shows the variations of the TDS of the OTE chaotic carrier, in the 
spaces of (A0, f0) and (D, f0). Here the TDS is defined as the maximum ACF value nearby the 
position of feedback delay in the ACF curve. Figure 4(a) shows that, with a PM index larger 
than 0.3 and a PM frequency higher than 5 GHz, it is easy to suppress the TDS toward an 
indistinguishable level close to 0. Similarly, in Fig. 4(b), it is shown that the higher the PM 
frequency and the larger the dispersion coefficient, the easier the TDS can be suppressed 
toward a level close to 0. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that, to efficiently suppress the 
TDS of the chaotic carrier, the value of f0 should not be an integral multiple of the external-
cavity resonation frequency (1/τf). This is because when the value of f0 is an integral multiple 
of 1/τf, the phase modulation frequency is harmonic to the external cavity resonance 
frequency, as such the phase modulation in the OTE module cannot efficiently destruct the 
periodicity induced by the linear external cavity optical feedback. 
 
Fig.4. (a) TDS value in ACF of OTE chaotic carrier versus the PM index A0 and frequency f0; (b) 
TDS value in ACF of OTE chaotic carrier in the space of the dispersion coefficient D and the 
PM frequency f0, for the case of A0=Vπ. 
In general, based on the joint effects of the spectrum expansion of phase modulation and 
the phase-to-intensity conversion of the dispersion component in the OTE module, 
conventional original chaotic signal can be encrypted as a totally uncorrelated flat-spectrum 
wideband chaotic signal with indistinguishable TDS. Based on such properties, the privacy of 
the original chaotic carrier can be greatly enhanced in both the time domain and the frequency 
domain. 
4. Chaos synchronization and message transmission  
In this section we focus on the properties of chaos synchronization and the secure message 
transmission. As already stated, at the receiver end, the encrypted chaotic carrier is firstly 
decrypted by a matching OTD module. The PM driving signal in the OTD module is the 
inverse-phase replica of that in OTE module, and the coefficient of the OTD dispersion unit 
DD is determined by Eq. (10). After that, the decrypted chaotic carrier is sent into the SSL to 
achieve original chaotic carrier synchronization for the final message decryption. 
4.1 Performance of chaotic carrier synchronization 
Figure 5 shows the intensity waveforms of the original chaotic carrier outputted by the MSL 
(IMSL(t)), the OTE chaotic signal (IOTE(t)), the corresponding OTD chaotic carrier (IOTD(t)), the 
receiver-end local chaotic carrier generated by SSL (ISSL(t)), as well as the pairwise cross-
correlations between the original chaotic carrier and the other three chaotic signals. The CCF 
curve in Fig. 5(e) shows that the correlation coefficient between the OTE chaotic signal and 
the original chaotic carrier is smaller than 0.04, this means that the cross correlation between 
them is very weak. The original chaotic carrier is, therefore, encrypted as a totally 
uncorrelated signal, this agrees with the phenomenon shown in Fig. 2. Based on this property, 
the privacy of the original chaotic carrier can be guaranteed by transmitting the OTE chaotic 
carrier over the public fiber link. On the other hand, the comparison between the OTD chaotic 
signal in Fig. 5(c) and the original chaotic carrier in Fig. 5(a) indicates that the original 
chaotic carrier is successfully decrypted by the OTD module from the link-transmission 
signal, this  can also be confirmed by the CCF curve in Fig. 5(f), where a cross correlation 
coefficient of 0.99 between the OTD chaotic carrier and the original chaotic carrier is 
observed. Due to the dispersion and nonlinearity of the fiber link, some high-frequency small-
amplitude jitters appear in the OTD chaotic carrier, this induces negligible distortions, with 
respect to the original chaotic carrier. Nevertheless, with the low-pass filtering effect of the 
SSL and the injection-locking effect, the transmission distortion does not induce any obvious 
degradations in chaos synchronization between the SSL and the MSL. As shown in Fig. 5(g), 
the local chaotic carrier can be well synchronized with the original chaotic carrier with a 
correlation coefficient of 0.99. 
 
Fig.5. Temporal intensities of (a) original chaotic carrier, (b) OTFE chaotic carrier, (c) OTFD 
chaotic carrier, and d local chaotic carrier generated by SSL. (e)–(g) the cross-correlations 
between original chaos and the other three chaotic signals. 
Figure 6(a) shows the synchronization quality between the original chaotic carrier and the 
local chaotic carrier versus the injection strength in the proposed system and the conventional 
system without incorporating the OTE/OTD. It is shown that the performance of the proposed 
system is similar to that of the conventional system. With sufficiently strong injection, high 
quality chaos synchronization can be easily achieved. On the other hand, Fig. 6(b) shows the 
comparison of mismatch robustness properties between the proposed system and the 
conventional system. The mismatch is introduced using the method reported in [29, 30]. The 
results indicate that the OTE and OTD processes in the proposed system do not induce 
obvious mismatch robustness degradation with respect to that in the conventional systems. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that in the proposed system, the OTE and OTD processes do 
not induce considerable synchronization performance degradation for the chaotic carriers.  
 
Fig. 6. Comparison of chaos synchronization quality versus (a) injection strength and (b) 
parameter mismatch in the proposed system (triangle) and conventional system without 
OTE/OTD (circle). 
4.2 Performance of chaotic communication 
By making use of the high-quality chaos synchronization, we investigate the secure chaotic 
communication in the proposed system. The message encryption is performed by the method 
of chaos modulation, which can be mathematically described as Imod(t)=IMSL(t)[1+Am·m(t)], 
where Imod(t) denotes the intensity of the modulated chaotic carrier, the message m(t) is a 
random binary sequence, and Am=0.1 is the modulation index [20, 30, 31]. The message 
decryption is carried out by the way of direct subtraction decoding, which is described as 
m'(t)=LPF[IOTD(t)-ISSL(t)]. Here the LPF operation uses a five-order Butterworth low-pass-
filter with a cutoff frequency equal to the message bit rate R. To quantify the system 
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where I1 and I0 stand for the average power of bits “1” and “0”, respectively; while σ1 and σ0 
are their corresponding standard deviations.  
Figure 7 shows the temporal waveforms of the original messages and their corresponding 
decrypted messages, as well as the corresponding eye diagrams of the decrypted messages, 
for three-channel WDM communication systems with R=2 Gbit/s. Here the WDM channels 
are centralized at 1550 nm with a channel spacing of 0.8 nm (100 GHz), namely λ-1=1549.2 
nm, λ0=1550 nm, λ+1=1550.8 nm. Clearly, the messages transmitted on all the WDM channels 
are correctly recovered, and the widely-open eye diagrams also mean low BERs of the 
decrypted message.  
To further investigate the communication performance of the proposed system, the solid 
curves in Fig. 8 show the BER performance of legal communication versus the bit rate of the 
message R. It is shown that although the BER performance degrades as the increase of 
message bit rate, an acceptable communication performance with a BER lower than 10-6 can 
be achieved when the bit rates of channel λ-1, channel λ0 and channel λ+1 are lower than 4.5 
Gbit/s, 6 Gbit/s and 4.5Gbit/s, respectively. The BER performances on the side-wavelength 
channels (the triangle curves) are similar and worse than that of the central-wavelength 
channel. The BER degradation on the side-wavelength channels here is attributed to the 
dispersion considered in DD of the OTD module (see Eq. 10) is evaluated according to the 
transmission dispersion on the central wavelength channel λ0. For the side-wavelength 
channels, the dispersion amounts considered in DD is not as accurate as the actual 
transmission dispersions experienced by these channels, as such, the transmission dispersions 
cannot be compensated completely. Consequently, the decryption performances of these 
channels are degraded because of the residual transmission dispersion-induced distortion. It is 
worth mentioning that due to the channel cross-talk, the BER performance of WDM 
communication is slightly worse than that of the single channel transmission scenario (solid-
circle). 
 
Fig. 7. Illustration of WDM message encryption/decryption processes. (a), (b), (c) show the 
original messages (dashed) and recovery messages (solid) on the three channels of λ-1=1549.2 
nm, λ0=1550 nm, λ+1=1550.8 nm, for the cases with bit rates of 2 Gbit/s, respectively, while (a1), 
(b1), (c1) show the corresponding eye diagrams. 
 
Fig. 8. Performance (Log(BER)) of the legal decryption (solid), the illegal interception from 
the original modulated chaotic carrier by DLF (dashed-diamond), the interception from the 
OTE chaotic carrier by DLF (dashed-triangle), and the interception by the synchronization 
utilization method (dashed-circle) 
5. Security analysis  
In this section, the security of message transmission in the proposed system is discussed. On 
one hand, the system security under the typical blind attack scenarios occurring on the public 
link, namely DLF and synchronization utilization, as mentioned above, are considered. On the 
other hand, the physical key space of the OTE is investigated. For the sake of simplicity, only 
the single channel transmission scenario (λ=λ0=1550 nm) is discussed in this section. 
However, it is reasonable to expect that the system security under the centralized WDM 
communication scenario can be further enhanced with respect to the single channel scenario. 
This is because it is extremely difficult for the eavesdropper to obtain correct chaotic carriers 
from the compound signal transmitted over the public channel, without matching the OTD 
module and precise wavelength de-multiplexer or optical filters. 
5.1 Security under blind link attacks 
The DLF is the most straightforward attack way of intercepting messages from public fiber 
links. Under this scenario, the eavesdropper adopts a low-pass filter to intercept the message 
directly from the public link. In our simulations, a five-order Butterworth low-pass filter with 
a cutoff frequency equal to the message bit rate R is used to directly intercept the message 
from the fiber link between the MSL and the SSL. In Fig. 8, the dashed-circle and dashed-
diamond curves show the BERs of the message intercepted by DLF from the original 
modulated chaotic carrier and the OTE chaotic carrier. Obviously, the BERs of the 
intercepted messages in the proposed system are too high for the eavesdropper to obtain 
correct message. Moreover, with respect to the BER of the intercepted message in the 
conventional system without OTE, the BER in the proposed system is much higher. In the 
conventional system, when the bit rate is 1 Gbit/s, the message can be illegally decrypted with 
a BER lower than 10-5, it cannot defend the DLF attack. While in the present system, the BER 
of the intercepted message is about 0.08, it is difficult for the eavesdropper to correctly 
recover the original message. These results indicate that with the OTE, the message can be 
more efficiently hidden in the link chaotic carrier, and the proposed system can successfully 
defend against the DLF attack, even when the bit rate of message is low. 
Regarding the attack of synchronization utilization, we consider the most serious case, in 
which the eavesdropper is equipped with an attack laser (SLA) that is an ECSL identical to 
the MSL and the SSL. The OTE chaotic carrier transmitted on the public link is split, 
amplified and then injected into the SLA to achieve chaos synchronization for the illegal 
message decryption. The injection strength is set as 80 ns-1 as that of the legal decryption to 
obtain high quality chaos synchronization. The dashed-triangle curve in Fig. 8 shows the BER 
variation of the intercepted message under this type of attack versus the message bit rate. 
Apparently, with respect to the legal decryption (solid circle curve), the BER of the 
intercepted message is always maintained at a very high level. Even in the low bit rate 
transmission case of R=1 Gbit/s, the BER of the intercepted message under this attack is 
larger than 0.1. Therefore, the proposed scheme can also defend against the attack of 
synchronization utilization. 
In summary, in the proposed system, it is difficult for the eavesdropper to intercept the 
correct message from the chaotic carrier transmitted over the public fiber link. Comparing 
with the conventional chaotic communication scheme without OTE, the proposed system can 
significantly enhance the security against the public link attacks. 
5.2 Physical key space analysis 
In the proposed system, due to the introduction of the OTE, the mismatch sensitivity of the 
control parameters, namely the amplitude A0 and the frequency f0 of the PM driving signal, as 
well as the dispersion coefficients (DE and DD in Eq. (10)), is also an important factor 
determining the system security. Since they are physical parameters of hardware, we refer 
them to as the physical keys, which are different from the keys in the conventional 
cryptography system where the keys are generated by algorithms rather than physical signals. 
Based on the key space analysis method in [33], the physical key space is determined by the 
tuning ranges and the mismatch resolutions of the tunable parameters of the PM and 
dispersive component, namely A0, f0 and D. 
Figure 9 shows the influences of the parameter mismatches of the PM driving signal on the 
BER of the decrypted message, for a bit rate of 5 Gbit/s. From the perspective of the common 
commercial availability, the maximum tuning range of A0 is set as 4Vπ, and 40GHz for f0. The 
mismatch resolution is defined as the critical mismatch point where the BER of the recovered 
message corresponds to 0.1, which is large enough to guarantee that no useful message can be 
recovered. As shown in Fig. 9(a), the BER performance degrades gradually, as the increase of 
the mismatch of A0, and a mismatch about 0.4Vπ causes a BER larger than 0.1. Moreover, 
Fig. 9(b) shows that the BER is sensitive to the mismatch of f0. A frequency mismatch as 
small as about 150 kHz would cause the BER to rapidly increase to 0.1. Therefore, the private 
PM can contribute a physical key space about 2.67×106 (4Vπ/0.4Vπ×40GHz/150kHz) to the 
security system. It is also worth mentioning that the key space can be further enlarged by 
increasing the number of PMs or using high-speed modulator in the OTE module. 
 
Fig. 9. Sensitivity of BER to the mismatches of (a) PM index A0 and (b) PM frequency f0. Here 
the message bit rate is chosen as R=5Gbit/s. 
Figure 10 shows the influence of the mismatch of dispersion coefficient on the BER 
performance. Here, the value of DE is fixed, while DD is mismatched from its optimum value 
determined by Eq. (10). It is shown that a mismatch resolution about 15ps/nm/km would 
degrade the BER to a threshold level of 0.1. If the dispersion unit is an optical fiber, there is 
an infinite key space, as long as the fiber is sufficiently long (here the transmission loss of 
fiber is not considered, since it can be effectively compensated by with optical amplifiers, 
such as EDFAs and SOAs). If a pair of tunable chirped fiber Bragg gratings (CFBG) with a 
tuning range from -2000 ps/nm to 2000 ps/nm are adopted in the OTE module and the OTD 
module, an additional key space about 89 [4000ps/nm/(15ps/nm/km×3km)] can be 
contributed to the proposed system. Consequently, the total physical key space is enhanced to 
2.37×108 (2.67×106×89). It is worth noting that the physical key space of the proposed system 
can be exponentially enhanced by cascading the dispersion units (dispersion fibers or CFBGs) 
in the OTE and OTD modules. When n pair of matching cascaded OTE and OTD modules 
are applied in the proposed scheme, the resulting physical key space would be (2.37×108)n. 
 
Fig. 10. Sensitivity of BER to the mismatch of dispersion coefficient D. here the parameters 
are identical to those in Fig. 9. 
6. Conclusions 
We have numerically demonstrated a physical security-enhanced chaotic communication 
scheme by encrypting the modulated chaotic carrier temporally. In the proposed system, 
rather than directly propagating through a public link, the modulated chaotic carrier is firstly 
encrypted as an uncorrelated chaotic signal and then transmitted to the receiver end. The 
numerical results have indicated that with the OTE the efficient bandwidth of the original 
chaotic carrier can be expanded by several times and the TDS in the original chaotic carrier 
can also be completely suppressed, and the OTE chaotic carrier is fully uncorrelated with the 
original chaotic carrier, these properties greatly enhance the privacy of the chaotic carrier. 
With a matching OTD module, the original chaotic carrier can be successfully decrypted, and 
high-quality chaotic carrier synchronization can be achieved, which supports centralized 
WDM message encryption and decryption at several Gbit/s, without any dispersion 
compensation. The proposed system can efficiently defend against typical blind attacks that 
threaten the security of conventional chaotic communication configurations. Moreover, the 
communication performance is sensitive to the parameter mismatches between the OTE and 
OTD modules, this provides an additional large physical key space for the security system, 
and the security can be exponentially increased by cascading the OTE modules. The proposed 
scheme paves a solid path leading to its implementation in high-security optical chaotic 
communication systems. 
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